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The last two decades has witnessed an increase in globalizing influences affecting most 
countries, Africa included. These influences have arisen partly as a result of domestic 
and international policies, such as trade policies, and partly as a result of general 
globalizing impulses, such as technological developments and enhanced 
communications. The single overarching objective of this paper is to outline the macro 
evidence on the extent to which globalization is taking place and poverty is reducing in 
Africa, and to consider this to both characteristics of the region (i.e., within the region) 
and relative to other global regions. It draws on some of the most recent evidence about 
the globalizing processes in various forms so as to try to determine the speed and extent 
of globalization in Africa. This helps to put into proper perspective the impact of 
globalization on poverty and inequality. It is essentially a partial and descriptive 
approach, at best indicative of associations, and stops short of attempting to identify, 
empirically, channels of influence and causal relationships. 
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1 Introduction 
The last decade or so has witnessed the process of globalization; a process characterized 
by an increasing degree of market openness and more integration—between countries 
and within the global economy more generally (Nissanke and Thorbecke 2005). Market 
openness is reflected in increasing cross-border movement in goods, people, capital, and 
the transfer of technology and information. While the globalizing forces in respect of 
commodities and, to some extent, of factors, stem from the increasingly liberalized 
international policy regime of the 1980s and 1990s (Dollar 2005), evidence on the degree 
or the extent of globalization in its various manifestations is not easy to assemble at the 
individual country level, and still less so at a regional or world level. In particular, while 
there are some assertions, there is much less by way of hard evidence on the extent of 
globalization in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) relative to other regions, and on what impact 
increasing global interdependence is having on poverty in countries in Africa.1 There is 
also relatively little knowledge about the channels of impact of globalization on poverty 
in African countries.  
This paper has one single overarching objective. It is to outline the macro evidence on 
the extent to which globalization is taking place and poverty is reducing in Africa, and 
to consider this in relation to both characteristics of the Africa region (i.e., within the 
region) and relative to other global regions. This draws on some of the most recent 
evidence about the globalizing processes in various forms in order to try to determine 
the speed and extent of globalization in Africa. This is potentially important in helping 
to put into proper perspective the likely impact of globalization on poverty and 
inequality. It is therefore essentially a partial and descriptive approach, at best indicative 
of associations, and is therefore not analytically rigorous enough to identify the 
channels of influence and possible causal relationships discussed by Nissanke and 
Thorbecke (2005) and by Bourguignon (2004). 
Some important previous studies take a similarly broad perspective and examine the 
evidence on globalization, inequality and the poverty nexus in Africa. In particular, in a 
broad-ranging paper, Geda and Shimeless (2005) examine many patterns of association 
between social and economic variables, including poverty, inequality and openness, in 
an attempt to establish whether there is a causal link between greater global 
interdependence and poverty. Likewise, Kayizzi-Mugerwa (2001) addresses the same 
issue, but with reliance on evidence from selected African countries, though with less 
reference to poverty and inequality indicators. Various reports, in particular by UNECA 
(1999, 2004, 2005) and UNCTAD (2002, 2003, 2004a and 2005) provide very useful 
and extensive statistical and economic analyses around these broad issues. Several other 
papers empirically examine aspects of globalization, growth, and/or poverty and 
inequality more formally in an African context. These include Christiaensen, Demery 
and Paternostro (2003), who examine some macro and micro perspectives on growth 
and poverty; Collier and Gunning (1999) who review the empirical evidence on Africa’s 
relatively poor growth performance; and many country-specific studies (econometric 
and simulation studies). The present paper does not attempt to replicate any of this 
previous work, but instead the attempt is to look afresh at some of the most recent 
empirical evidence. 
                                                 
1   Throughout this paper ‘Africa’ is used synonymously with ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ (SSA) unless 
otherwise stated. 2 
2  The Sub-Saharan Africa region in a global context 
2.1  Identifying trends in globalization, growth, poverty and inequality 
To make any significant headway in identifying the channels of impact of globalization 
on poverty in Africa, it is helpful to find ways of tracking the broad globalizing features 
of African countries, both over time and relative to other countries and regions. For 
analytical purposes there are clear advantages in seeking quantifiable evidence, as there 
are obvious difficulties in relying on qualitative evidence, even though some facets of 
globalization are extremely hard to quantify. 
Globalization via trade 
Many writers suggest that globalization is a process that has several interpretations 
(Bigsten and Durevall 2003), though it is universally recognized to reflect increasing 
global integration, not just from the liberalization of commodity and factor markets, but 
also of cross-border movements of labour and capital, transfers of incomes and 
technology, and an increase in communication and the flow of information between 
countries. It is probably true that most research has focused on economic globalization, 
and most often on trade liberalization. There are two good reasons for this. Obviously, 
one is to do with tractability and, in particular, measurability. Estimates of exports of 
goods and non-factor services are routinely assembled as part of countries’ national 
accounts and balance-of-payments statistics, and, moreover, they are internationally 
comparable. International movements of capital, human migration, and international   
 
Table 1 
Global comparisons of trade openness and growth 
  1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
       
 Trade  openness1: (X+M)/GDP 
Sub-Saharan Africa  55.4 53.0 54.8 60.1 65.3 
Latin America and Caribbean  27.3 29.2 32.0 39.3 43.4 
South Asia  19.2  17.8 22.4 27.5 32.6 
East Asia  29.2  36.6 50.7 59.8 73.9 
E Europe and Central Asia  na  na  59.1  67.3  73.9 
Middle East and North Africa  57.6 41.5 59.7 54.0 56.9 
World  total  37.9 36.6 38.8 43.9 48.5 
       
Sub-Saharan Africa (with country weights)2  69.3 65.3 68.6 70.4 75.7 
       
  Growth of GDP per capita (average annual)3 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.2  -0.2  -2.0  0.8  1.5 
Latin America and Caribbean  -0.8 0.3 1.7 0.9 0.8 
South Asia  3.2  3.6 2.8 4.0 3.7 
East Asia  5.7  6.2 7.7 5.4 6.5 
E Europe and Central Asia  na  na  -5.4  1.6  5.3 
Middle East and North Africa  0.7  -1.2 1.8 1.7 2.5 
World  total  0.5 2.0 0.8 1.7 1.6 
Note:  na = not available 
Sources:   1)  World Bank (2005) (calculated from current US$ estimates); 
   2)  Own calculates based on World Bank (2005); 
   3)  Average annual % (World Bank 2005).  3 
transfers of technology are more difficult to track. But besides the data issue there is a 
second good reason. Trade liberalization is a policy-determined influence and it is 
relatively more tractable to analysis than might be the case with many other kinds of 
globalizing influences, especially those involving social and political variables. 
Empirically, trade liberalization is usually measured via outcome variables such as trade 
openness (Sachs and Warner 1995) or via policy input measures such as average tariff 
rates or quota restrictions.  
In order to examine some features of globalization trends in Africa relative to other 
global regions, in Table 1 we show some summary data on performance in SSA in 
respect of trade openness, alongside evidence on economic growth, over the period 
1980 to 2004. Estimates are shown for 5-year periods for each of regions (low- and 
middle-income countries) where comparable data are available. Clearly, such selectivity 
over periods of time can be problematic because we may miss events and macro 
features of individual years. However, this span covers the period when many African 
countries embarked on economic reform programmes, and it includes the decade or so 
of their aftermath. 
Turning first to the evidence on trade openness, following Sachs and Warner (1995) we 
use a measure of trade intensity, that is, imports plus exports relative to GDP (measured 
in current US$). Three important issues about measuring trade intensity should be 
noted. First, ceteris paribus, one would expect the ratio to decline with income, so if a 
ratio for a region is based on country ratios weighted by GDP, then this is likely to be 
lower than an equivalent ratio using (equal) country weights. Second, if trade and GDP 
are valued at PPP units, then the ratios are also likely to be lower (as GDP in PPP prices 
for low-income countries are higher than in current dollars, while trade values would 
remain the same). Table 1 is therefore based on average trade intensity measured in 
current US dollars. Third, the ratio is likely to be affected by country- or region-specific 
effects, which has led some researchers to control for these factors before making 
comparisons across regions. 
The first panel of Table 1 shows the expected general trend towards greater openness 
over the two decades across all global regions between 1980 and 2004, based on GDP 
weights. The trend is not uniform, either across regions or over time, and this is an 
important feature. At first sight, openness in SSA is higher than other regions in almost 
all years shown, but this is potentially misleading because of region-specific factors 
(IMF 2005). Low levels of per capita income, geographical location, and the 
composition of trade (predominantly exports of primary goods and imports of 
manufactured and capital goods) make African countries relatively more dependent on 
trade (relative to their income) (UNCTAD 2004b). Average trade intensity has 
increased in Africa in line with the overall global increase, but not as rapidly as almost 
all other low- and middle-income regions. East Asia increased from 29 per cent in 1980-
84 to 74 per cent in 2000-4; and Latin America and South Asia also increased by more 
than Africa. Table 1 also shows the trade intensity ratios for Africa calculated with 
equal country weights. They confirm expectations that the ratios are considerably higher 
than those with GDP weights although the trend between each 5-year period is broadly 
comparable.2 
                                                 
2  Averages are based on those countries for which trade intensity ratios have been recorded. So the 
estimates are subject to errors due to composition. 4 
In spite of the increase in trade intensity, Africa’s share of total world trade has fallen 
over these two decades.3 UNCTAD (2003) attributes the reasons for this downturn to 
the region’s primary commodity dependence and the structure of international trade, and 
to market access and the agricultural policies of industrialized countries. Similarly, 
Bigsten and Durevall (2003) suggest two conflicting inferences; either that Africa has 
not globalized, at least to the same extent as other regions, or, that it has done as well as 
it could, given its underlying geography and characteristics. But the reduction in the 
share of total world trade and the increase in the trade intensity ratio are consistent with 
the relatively poor performance of Africa in terms of economic growth. There are also 
endemic obstacles to intra-African trade through high transaction costs (non-tariff 
barriers, and poor infrastructure) (UNCTAD 2004b). 
Relying solely on trade intensity as an indicator of trade liberalization is problematic, 
and still more so as a measure of globalization, because there are many factors that may 
influence the ratio besides liberalization policies. Some researchers prefer to use a 
policy-input measure, such as average tariff rates (weighted or unweighted) but this 
does not necessarily take into account the full consequential effect of tariffs and non-
tariff restrictions. And finding the tariff equivalents of non-tariff restrictions is difficult. 
Pritchett (1996) and others consider a ‘structure-adjusted trade intensity’ measure along 
with other alternative measures of outward orientation. He corrects trade intensity for 
structural characteristics (size, GDP per capita and resource endowment characteristics) 
similar to the Chenery-Syrquin adjustments in measuring country typologies. This is 
also similar to controlling for region fixed-effects. Table 1 therefore needs to be 
interpreted with some caution. 
Growth 
Relative growth performance of Africa compared with other regions is shown in the 
lower panel of Table 1. The table confirms the now well-established fact that Africa’s 
growth performance (GDP per capita) has been worse, period by period, than any other 
region since 1980, with the possible exception of Eastern Europe prior to economic 
reform. In fact, more detailed estimates show this to be so throughout the decade of the 
1990s, with growth rates also being predominantly negative. However, a reversal 
occurred in 2000 and 2001, and the most recent estimates suggest that per capita growth 
is continuing to rise sharply, with rates of 2.1 and 2.8 per cent being recorded in 2003 
and 2004 (ADB 2005). Many authors offer explanations for the relatively poor 
performance, such as economic policy failures, low levels of education and skills of the 
labourforce, poor infrastructure, conflict and political instability, rent-seeking behaviour 
(Bigsten and Durevall 2003), poor institutions (Acemoglou, Johnson and Robinson 
2001). What the table does not adequately show is the relatively strong growth 
performance in the Africa region since 2002, relative, that is, to performance before 
2002, although growth is still low compared with other regions.  
The link between trade and growth has been examined by many authors, most 
prominently recently by Frankel and Romer (1999), Dollar and Kraay (2002) and 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999), Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (1998), and with the 
literature usefully reviewed in an Africa context by Hammouda (2004). Whether there is 
                                                 
3  UNCTAD (2003: Table 1) reports Africa’s share of world exports falling from about 6 per cent to 1.5 
per cent, and imports from 5 per cent to 1.5 per cent (merchandise trade) over the period from 1980 to 
2002. 5 
a causal link, or a correlation that is controlled by other factors, is still a matter of some 
controversy. However, the estimates in Table 1 suggest that global regions which 
showed the greatest increase in openness also experienced the fastest growth, and that 
Africa recorded relatively little increase in openness and slow growth in this period. 
Globalization via foreign direct investment 
Since the early 1990s many developing countries have enhanced their efforts to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and the most successful have been those engaged in 
exporting fuels and mining products and fast-growing exporters of manufactures 
(UNCTAD 2005). Within Africa, as in any of the global regions, there is considerable 
variance across countries in this regard. However, the relative increase in growth of FDI 
has sometimes been used as another indicator of globalization (Geda and Shimeless 
2005), partly to indicate the degree of integration into world capital markets. Table 2 
shows estimates of FDI flows (inflows and outflows combined) expressed relative to 
GDP and (net inflows) as shares of the total net FDI received by developing countries, 
in both cases shown at the regional level.4 Because FDI is a relatively volatile measure  
 
Table 2 
Global comparisons of FDI 
  1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
  Foreign direct investment:  
FDI(I+O)/GDP (%)1,a 
       
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.30 0.50 0.72 2.04 2.74 
Latin America and Caribbean  0.83 0.75 1.17 3.26 3.16 
South Asia  0.07  0.10 0.23 0.68 0.67 
East Asia  0.57  0.90 2.99 3.98 3.13 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.06  0.07  0.47 2.22 2.81 
Middle East and North Africa  0.46 0.47 0.91 0.76 1.08 
World  total  0.54 0.77 0.84 2.00 2.64 
       
Sub-Saharan Africa (with country weights)2  0.84 0.94 1.31 4.53 4.56 
  Foreign direct investment:  
FDI1, 2, b (regional shares of total)c 
       
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.06 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.06
Latin America and Caribbean  0.47 0.42 0.31 0.40 0.34
South Asia  0.01  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
East Asia  0.31  0.35 0.51 0.37 0.33
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.01  0.02  0.10 0.15 0.21
Middle East and North Africa  0.13 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.03
       
Developing countries as a share of  world  total  0.21 0.12 0.26 0.26 0.18
Notes:   a)  I (inflows) and O (outflows); 
   b)  Net inflows only: net inflows dominate net outflows in these regions; 
   c)  Regional shares of total net inflows across the six regions. (These may include flows 
between regions.)  
Sources:   1)  World Bank (2005) (average annual ratios); 
   2)  Own calculations based on World Bank (2005). 
                                                 
4   Clearly, shares of the total can only be calculated for net figures. Inflows of FDI greatly exceed 
outflows for Africa. But the opposite may be true in the case of private capital flows other than FDI. 6 
Table 2 again shows estimates smoothed as 5-year averages. The top panel does confirm 
the marked increase in FDI relative to GDP over the 25-year period, and especially in 
the last decade. Africa does better than most other regions, increasing from 0.30 per 
cent in the first period to 2.74 per cent in the final 5-year period. The same ratio based 
on (equal) country weights suggests an even greater increase, reflecting the high ratios 
in some very low-income countries (e.g., Chad). In terms of the regional shares of FDI, 
the estimates are far less favourable to Africa. The second panel shows that around 6 per 
cent of total net FDI inflows to developing countries have accrued to Africa throughout 
this period. The increase in the share of world FDI that was received by developing 
countries in the 1990s (a globalizing feature?) did not significantly impact on Africa: 
Africa’s share fell to 4 per cent of the total during this period. 
Poverty 
There are also significant and well-known conceptual problems in making poverty 
comparisons. There is a choice to be made between income and non-monetary based 
measures, and in the case of the former, a selection of poverty lines and appropriate 
aggregate poverty measures to account for the chronic and hard-core poor. Table 3 
simply shows estimates of income poverty (based on the $1 a day international poverty 
line) taken from the latest published estimates by Chen and Ravallion (2004). For Africa 
the estimates are significant. They show little or no progress over the two decades, in fact, 
quite the reverse. Based on this measure, the number of poor increased in this region, 
almost doubling from about 164 million to 313 million. Over the same period, the world 
total fell, largely due to a dramatic reduction in the number of poor in China and a modest 
reduction in India.5 Table 3 shows that the proportion of the world’s poor in Africa rose 
from about 11 per cent in 1981 to approximately 29 per cent in 2001. In terms of 
headcount indices, which normalize these poverty estimates to levels of population, the 
results look somewhat different. For Africa the incidence of poverty is approximately 
constant, between 44 and 46 percent, for much of the two decades although a slight rise 
is perceptible on a year-on-year basis (Chen and Ravallion 2004: Table 3). Using the 
world headcount ratio as a benchmark, we see that the outcome for the Africa region is 
far worse; the relative size of the poverty incidence increased sharply, the ratios rising 
from just over 1.0 in 1981, to 1.65 in 1987 and well over 2.0 in 2001. 
Inequality 
There are very few comparative estimates of levels and changes in inequality on a 
global or regional basis. As in the case of poverty, we focus only on income (or 
expenditure) inequality. Milanovic (2005) and Ravallion (2004) identify several 
significant issues in measuring inequality. These issues are due not only to the scarcity 
of data but also to alternative conceptual bases for measurement. In particular, 
Milanovic6 distinguishes between inter-country inequality (concept 1, country weights), 
international inequality (concept 2, population weights) and global inequality (concept 
3, this includes intra-country inequality). Thus, with access to individual-level data from 
                                                 
5   Note that these results are sensitive to the choice of the poverty line. With a $2 a day measure, while 
the number in poverty in SSA still rises dramatically, and very nearly doubles, the world total now 
rises, but less sharply. This is due to quite different outcomes for China and India: over this period the 
fall is less dramatic for China while there is now an increase for India. 
6  Milanovic (2005) refers to these as ‘concept 1’, ‘concept 2’ and ‘concept 3’ inequality, respectively. 7 
household surveys, the true spread of incomes (concept 3) is a combination of inequality 
within countries and between countries.7 Milanovic (2002) estimates regional inequality 
(using Gini coefficients) for broad regional groups, corresponding close to the years 
1988 and 1993. His global (concept 3) estimates are reproduced in Table 4a. 
The results show a general world increase in inequality during this period, together with 
a corresponding increase in Africa. Inequality changes in other regions vary 
considerably, with slight reductions in Western Europe, North America, Oceania 
(WENAO) and in Latin America, a sharp increase in Eastern Europe, and a comparable 
increase in Asia to that of Africa.  
Detailed analysis and decomposition for Africa suggest that this overall increase for 
Africa arises from a slight decline in intra-country inequality, a sharp increase in 
between-country inequality and (in consequence) a reduction in the ‘overlapping’ 
component. Nevertheless, the between-country inequality in Africa is a good deal lower 
than the between-country inequality in Asia. 
From the point of view of assessing the impacts of globalization at the country level 
(within the Africa region, or within other regions), estimates of inter-country inequality 
(based on country Ginis, using country weights) might be more appropriate. Table 4b 
shows estimates taken from Milanovic (2003) for countries in Africa compared with the 
rest of the world, for the decades of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The evidence is 
 
Table 3 
Global comparisons of poverty trends 
  1981 1987 1993 1996 2001 
 Income  poverty1 (headcount ratios) 
       
Sub-Saharan Africa  41.6 46.8 44.1 45.6 46.4 
Latin America and Caribbean    9.7 10.9 11.3 10.7    9.5 
South Asia  51.5  45.0 40.1 36.6 31.3 
East Asia  57.7  28.0 24.9 16.6 14.9 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia   0.7   0.4   3.7   4.3   3.6 
Middle East and North Africa   5.1   3.2   1.6   2.0   3.4 
World  total  40.4 28.4 26.3 22.8 21.1 
Ratio: SSA/World  1.03 1.65 1.68 2.00 2.20 
  Income poverty2 (numbers million) 
       
Sub-Saharan Africa  163.6 218.6 242.3 271.4 312.7 
Latin America and Caribbean   35.6   45.1   52.0   52.2   49.8 
South Asia  474.8  473.3 476.2 461.3 431.1 
East Asia  795.6  425.6 415.4 286.7 271.3 
Easter Europe and Central Asia    3.1    1.7   17.5   20.1   17.0 
Middle East and North Africa    9.1    6.7    4.1    5.5    7.1 
World total  1481.8  1171.2 1207.5 1097.2 1089.0 
Ratio: SSA/World  0.11 0.19 0.20 0.25 0.29 
Sources:   1) Chen and Ravallion (2004: Table 3); based on international poverty line ($1.08 1993 PPP); 
   2) Chen and Ravallion (2004: Table 4); based on international poverty line ($1.08 1993 PPP). 
                                                 
7   Of course not all inequality measures are exactly decomposable. For the Gini coefficient, which is not 
decomposable, Milanovic (2002, 2005) includes an ‘overlapping’ component. 8 
fragmentary, with few African countries having comparable individual-based household 
survey data in these decades. Nevertheless, the results do confirm that intra-country 
inequality in Africa does appear to be higher than in the rest of the world (Milanovic 
2003). This is further confirmed by a finer rest of the world regional breakdown 
reported by Geda and Shimeless (2005) based on UNECA (1999).8 What is even more 
noteworthy from Tables 4a and 4b is that the degree of income inequality in Africa has 
increased sharply between the 1980s and the 1990s. 
Table 4a 
Regional Gini coefficients in 1988 and 1993 
 1988  1993 
    
Africa 42.7  48.7 
Asia 55.9  61.8 
Latin America & Caribbean  57.1  55.6 
Eastern Europe  25.6  46.4 
Western Europe, North America, Oceania (WENAO)  37.1  36.6 
World 62.8  66.0 
Note:   ‘Africa’ includes north Africa: only 8 of the 12 countries included in the dataset (common sample) 
were from SSA. The results are based on household survey data. 
Source:   Milanovic (2002: Tables 10 and 16).  
Table 4b 
Regional Gini Coefficients over time 
 Africa  Rest  of  world 
    
1970s 47.0  34.2 
1980s 41.0  36.9 
1990s 45.9  37.8 
Source:  Milanovic (2003: Table 2) (calculated from the WIID dataset, and based on the relatively few  
countries for which Gini coefficients have been estimated for all periods). 
2.2  Measuring globalization: a composite index 
The issue of whether outcome measures or input measures are most appropriate cuts 
across whether globalization is, or should be, viewed as a phenomenon under the 
control of domestic policymakers (e.g., domestic trade policy), or whether it is a global 
phenomenon which is outside a country’s control (communications, technology, trade 
policy of other countries) and is therefore exogenously determined. Studies have 
generally considered facets of globalization such as trade, FDI, and capital flows, and 
the changing role of institutions and democratic processes as separate phenomena. 
There have been a few attempts to construct globalization indices which embrace more 
than just measures of trade and take into account some additional non-economic as well 
as economic factors. 
Responding to an initial attempt by Kearney (2001), Lockwood (2004) and 
subsequently Lockwood and Redoano (2005) have recently constructed an all-
                                                 
8   Survey comparability might be an issue here. Milanovic (2003) includes only individual-based 
household surveys, whereas the latter include household-based household survey evidence. 9 
embracing CSGR9 index applied at country, region and world levels annually for the 
period 1982-2004. The overall index is a composite (an unweighted average) of three 
indices: an economic globalization index (EGI), a social globalization index (SGI) and a 
political globalization index (PGI). The EGI is based on four variables, all measuring 
international flows, standardized with respect to GDP; these include trade (the standard 
openness measure), foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and factor income 
remittances. The SGI is constructed from nine variables, four are included in a ‘people’ 
sub-index and five are in an ‘ideas’ sub-index. The ‘people’ sub-index includes stocks 
and flows of foreign population, and tourists, expressed as proportions of total 
population, and worker remittances as a proportion of GDP. The ‘ideas’ sub-index 
includes phone calls, internet users, the sum of books and newspapers imported and 
exported and mail, all expressed per capita. The PGI is derived from three variables; the 
numbers of embassies in country, and UN missions and international organizations in 
which the country participates. Each variable is normalized (actually, ‘panel-normalized’, 
so as to enable comparisons to be made across countries and over time), weighted and 
aggregated to form EGI, SGI and PGI indices for each country. The unweighted average 
of these indices yields an overall globalization index for each country. The regional 
indices are a weighted average of country indices, where the weights are equal to 
individual country GDP (at PPP values). The regional indices are, therefore, susceptible 
to composition effects as more countries enter the sample over time. 
Clearly, whatever virtues the index may have in indicating changes in globalization 
processes over time or in making comparisons of globalizing influences across countries 
or regions, there are many problems and deficiencies of the CSGR index too. The 
choice of variables is obviously crucial. A major influence in the choice is the availability 
of data, and the 16 variables listed above represent a first attempt based on a reasonable 
coverage of data. However, Lockwood and Redoano have attempted to choose variables 
that measure outcomes, rather than policy inputs directly. Also, for the trade openness 
measure especially, geographic and economic characteristics (such as population size, 
land area, and isolation) will influence the outcome measure. So what they do is to 
control for country characteristics in the measures of all their economic variables. 
Table 5 shows the CSGR index results at a regional level, concentrating only on the 
economic globalization index (EGI) and the overall index. The movement of the EGI 
for SSA shows an increase from a value of 0.034 in 1983 to a value of 0.123 in 2004. 
By way of comparison the 2004 figure does not reach the value achieved in western 
Europe at the beginning of the period in 1983 of 0.139; although the index for this 
region only rose to 0.160 in 2001. Better comparators might be the South Asia region or 
the Latin American and Caribbean region. The former started at an even lower value of 
0.009 in 1983 and rose to 0.146 in 2004: evidence of a much stronger globalizing 
outcome. The latter started higher at 0.094 and rose less strongly to 0.123 in 2001. In 
SSA a big shift occurred in the early 1990s; the index rose from 0.080 in 1993 to 0.126 
in 1997, with little change since then. The SGI and PGI indices (not shown) reflect 
similar sluggish movement, both over time and in comparison with other regions. For 
SSA the overall index of globalization shows a slightly stronger gradient in outcomes 
than we observe from the EGI alone, as in all regions and hence at the world level. But 
in 2004 it still falls well behind South Asia, although it seems to be on a par with Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
                                                 
9  Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, University of Warwick: www.csgr.org 10 
Table 5 
CSGR globalization index 
Region  1983 1987 1990 1993 1997 2000 2004 
  (a) Economic Globalization Index 
         
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.034  0.058 0.064 0.080 0.126 0.128 0.123 
Latin America and Caribbean  0.094 0.096 0.102 0.103 0.112 0.120 0.123 
South Asia  0.009  0.021  0.023 0.133 0.139 0.144 0.146 
East Asia and Pacific  0.113 0.107 0.114 0.112 0.122 0.135 0.138 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.025  0.013  0.002  0.010 0.122 0.133 0.130 
Middle East and North Africa  0.046 0.049 0.057 0.076 0.079 0.097 0.105 
North America  0.115  0.118  0.121 0.123 0.132 0.136 0.133 
Western Europe  0.139  0.134 0.140 0.142 0.152 0.174 0.160 
World 0.111  0.113  0.115  0.119 0.132 0.143 0.140 
  (b) Overall Globalization Index 
         
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.020  0.054 0.075 0.126 0.206 0.237 0.270 
Latin America and Caribbean  0.080 0.135 0.179 0.251 0.268 0.238 0.286 
South Asia  0.008  0.023  0.030 0.353 0.408 0.359 0.394 
East Asia and Pacific  0.171 0.198 0.235 0.281 0.316 0.413 0.524 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.024  0.014  0.002  0.021 0.332 0.323 0.376 
Middle East and North Africa  0.055 0.069 0.097 0.169 0.182 0.228 0.313 
North America  0.363  0.371  0.489 0.664 0.764 0.786 0.872 
Western Europe  0.254  0.277 0.343 0.537 0.555 0.670 0.754 
World 0.242  0.264  0.320  0.455 0.513 0.583 0.675 
Notes:  Sources of data are set out at www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/index/guide/sources/ 
Source:   Lockwood and Redoano (2005). 
 
Other empirical evidence on relative levels and changes in globalization between 
regions and over time does exist but is similarly fragmentary. Heshmati (2005) 
computes several composite indices of globalization, for example, one is based on the 
Kearney Foreign Policy index which combines a similar vector of components (but with 
equal weights) and a second which extracts the principal components of this vector (and 
hence has unequal weights). Amongst several methodological differences to the CSGR 
index, Heshmati relies on a balanced panel of data and hence the total number of 
countries included is only 62 worldwide. Of this total, only five countries from SSA are 
included in his dataset.10 Nevertheless, SSA emerges near the bottom of the rank order 
of world regions on the basis of all indices of globalization. 
The evidence is flimsy and we have to be cautious by not putting too much weight on 
the precise numerical scores, but the evidence is nevertheless quite compelling. Sub- 
Saharan Africa has not ‘globalized’ at the same pace, or to the same extent, as that of 
any other world region. It lags way behind what have been the outcomes in other 
regions where poor countries are also predominantly found. It may also be the case that 
the ways in which African countries are linked to the rest of the world are different, so 
that a scaling up of linkages might not be sufficient to reduce inequality and poverty in 
the region. This evidence on the slow rate of integration might also help to put into 
context some measures of other outcomes, including performance in terms of growth, 
poverty and inequality discussed earlier.  
                                                 
10 The countries are Nigeria, Botswana, South Africa, Senegal, Kenya and Uganda. 11 
3  Assessing the evidence across countries in Africa 
Against this background of the average broad trends and performance of Africa (SSA) 
relative to other global regions, there is much variation across and within the countries 
of the region. This variation and, in particular, the relatively poor performance of 
particular countries obviously explain the aggregate performance. There has been a 
recent and quite dramatic upturn in the growth performance in Africa (SSA) as a whole. 
But there is, as yet, only very limited evidence in terms of how this translates into 
poverty reduction. However, it is useful to examine some features of this 
macroeconomic performance more deeply and to set this against particular country 
characteristics.  
3.1  A typology approach to the analysis of globalization 
and growth performance  
Table 6 shows some comparisons of globalization and growth performance in 
subgroups of countries, chosen according to different criteria. Note that the analysis is 
based on averages across countries with country weights. Clearly this has the 
disadvantage that small countries are given the same weight as large countries, but is 
consistent with the use of country weights in standard regression analysis. Also, there 
has been no attempt to exclude outliers, although all the subgroups are sufficiently large 
that outliers do not affect the average values unduly. The analysis is restricted to two 
periods within the past decade, roughly the second half of the 1990s and the first half of 
the 2000s, primarily to identify any broad changes over time but in the most recent 
period. Comparisons are made in terms of real GDP growth, real GDP growth (in non-
oil sectors), real GDP per capita growth, trade intensity (trade to GDP ratios), FDI to 
GDP ratios, and the terms of trade. All of the reported measures are annualized 
averages, in real terms, and hence are smoothed and broadly comparable.11 The 
distinction between GDP and non-oil GDP is based on a treatment suggested by IMF 
(2005). We assume for the latter that they simply exclude the oil (extraction and 
refining) sectors but it is, of course, difficult to account for the indirect effects on other 
sectors. 
One long-standing basic hypothesis suggests that countries’ growth performance may be 
inextricably linked with their natural resource endowments, especially minerals and oil. 
Some evidence on recent growth performance across oil and non-oil-producing 
countries is reproduced as the first typology in Table 5. A comparison of growth 
performance in terms of real GDP and real GDP per capita12 confirms that oil-
producing countries have experienced higher growth rates on average than non-oil-
producing countries in both periods. Even when the oil sectors are excluded, the 
disparity remains. Interestingly, the trade intensity ratio is much higher (in both periods) 
in oil-producing countries, although the ratio increased slightly, on average, in non-oil-
producing countries between the first and second periods. Confirming expectations, the 
                                                 
11  The analysis may also be subject to exclusion bias, as small numbers of countries are excluded from 
parts of the analysis, due to absence of data. Missing observations have simply been treated as 
‘missing’. 
12 Note that, as these averages are based on country weights, and exclude some countries for which data 
are not available, the estimates are not consistent with the aggregate SSA estimates shown in Table 1.  12 
FDI/GDP ratios are considerably higher on average in oil-producing countries: oil 
attracts FDI inflows. The estimates show a slight increase, on average, in oil countries 
between the two periods and a slight fall in non-oil countries. Also the terms of trade 
index indicates a rising trend for oil countries, and a falling trend for non-oil countries. 
A cursory analysis of these results suggests that oil-producing countries may have had a 
tendency towards experiencing faster growth (and not necessarily confined to the oil 
sectors) and to have become more globalized than has been the case in the non-
oil producing countries. 
A second analysis is shown in Table 6 with respect to resource intensity levels and 
geographical aspects, as suggested by Sachs and Warner (1997) and Collier and 
Gunning (1999).13 Again, the results reveal expected outcomes. Resource-intensive 
countries14 have consistently grown faster on average than resource-poor countries, and 
have generally had higher trade intensity ratios, higher FDI/GDP ratios (high prices of 
key commodities attracting new exploration projects from overseas), and rising 
terms-of-trade indices (although lower on average than the benchmark year 2000). The 
average difference in performance between the coastal and landlocked categories of 
resource-poor countries is also discernable in both periods, though the differences are 
not dramatic. Coastal countries on average grew slightly faster (in terms of real GDP 
growth, real non-oil GDP growth, real GDP per capita growth), and the average trade 
intensity was higher. However the FDI/GDP ratios were lower, though not by a margin 
that would suggest an appreciable difference. The terms of trade indices for the coastal 
resource-poor countries are approximately the same in both periods and are falling for 
landlocked resource-poor countries, suggesting a pattern (a divergence) consistent with 
the other indicators. 
The third typology tackles a division between relatively fast- and relatively slow-
growing countries. In the 5-year period, 1990-94, many African countries recorded low, 
even negative average annual rates of growth; the overall average growth rate (country 
weights) was -0.2 per cent. Faced with the choice of subdividing countries into those 
above and below this average and those with positive and negative average growth 
rates, it was decided to go along with the latter. On this basis 25 countries were deemed 
to be relatively fast-growing and 17 relatively slow-growing. Either way, there are some 
anomalies: Zimbabwe is categorized as fast-growing and, on the chosen split, South 
Africa is deemed to be slow-growing. Nevertheless, in spite of the arbitrariness of the 
division the results are noteworthy. The fast-growing countries (in 1990-94) continue to 
have an average growth rate (of real GDP or GDP per capita) that exceeds that of 
previously slow-growing countries, but oil appears to explain most of this, because the 
comparison of average real non-oil GDP growth in the two subsequent periods shows 
very little difference and even a suggestion of a reversal in the second period. The 
globalization indicators, trade intensity and FDI/GDP ratios confirm expectations: with 
relatively high average ratios for the previous fast-growers. 
 
                                                 
13  The classifications are based on Collier and O’Connell (2004). 
14  These include all the oil-producing countries, with the exception of Chad and the Cote d’Ivoire (which 
were not included because their oil reserves were discovered only relatively recently), plus Botswana, 
Guinea, Namibia, Sierra Leone and Zambia. 13 
Table 6 
A typology of growth and globalization trends in SSA countries, 1995-2005 
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Oil-producing 
countries2 
4.3 6.2    5.0 5.8 4.3 2.6 97.3 94.3 10.7 11.0      85.3 108.3
Non-oil-producing 
countries 
2.8 3.8    2.8 3.8 2.2 1.3 63.7 71.6 3.2 2.8    104.3   99.2
           
Resource-
intensive3 
7.3 7.0    4.5 6.1 2.9 3.1 85.4 81.1 6.8  8.9    89.1  95.7
Coastal resource-
poor 
4.0 3.4    4.0 3.2 1.8 1.1 69.6 80.9 2.7 3.1    104.2 105.0
Landlocked 
resource-poor 
2.9 3.7    2.9 2.7 1.5 1.0 58.6 64.7 3.2 4.2    105.7   95.5
           
Fast growers 
in 1990-941 
7.1 3.9    4.7 3.6   1.5 4.1 85.6 87.9 8.1  5.0    98.0  93.1
Slow growers 
in 1990-94 
2.9 5.0    3.2 4.0 -3.2 0.6 60.1 67.5 2.3 4.1    102.0 103.3
Notes:  1)  ‘Fast growers’ are those countries whose average annual rate of growth of GDP per capita 
in the period 1990-94 was positive, the average for SSA in this period was -0.2 (see 
Appendix). 
Sources:  2)  The categories are based on classifications in IMF (2005); 
  3)  The categories are based on classifications in IMF (2005) which are in turn based on Collier 
and O’Connell (2004). 
The typologies considered here can be extended further. The work of Dollar and Kraay 
(2004) has been key to distinguishing the performance (in growth and poverty 
reduction) between ‘globalizers’ and ‘non-globalizers’ (defined according to trade 
intensity ratios) while Birdsall and Hamoudi (2002) suggest that these categories are 
closely aligned to ‘least-‘ and ‘most-’ commodity dependent countries (UNCTAD 2003 
and 2004). These are not pursued here but there is a point to be made that the alternative 
classifications are not necessarily orthogonal, and may indeed be highly correlated, as is 
already apparent in the three typologies selected above. 
The overall picture of globalization and growth performance in Africa in the last decade 
gained from this typology analysis is quite pronounced. There seems to be a 
considerable variation across countries, and some clear differences between subgroups 
defined according to their natural resource endowments (especially oil), to geographical 
features (landlocked versus coastal), and according to growth experience in the 
immediate previous 5-year period. The analysis is cursory, relying on averages, and 
with averaging over two periods of approximately five years so that some important 
variations may have been smoothed out. Nevertheless the differences between all 
subgroups are large and systematic, indicating that the following conclusions may be 
robust. There seems to be some association between growth and globalizing features (as 
measured by trade intensity and FDI/GDP ratios), and between natural resource 
endowments (including oil) and globalization. Clearly this is simply a cursory analysis 
based only on averages. It does not take into account within-subgroup variation, nor 14 
does it control for other factors that might affect the association, so causality cannot be 
inferred. 
3.2  Globalization, growth and governance 
Many authors now attribute at least part of Africa’s poor growth performance to poor 
governance, weak or inappropriate institutions, and continuing conflict (Sachs and 
Warner 1997; and Bigsten and Durevall 2003),15 the combination of which creates 
impediments to the accumulation of capital and the necessary structural change. 
Continuing the theme of exploring patterns and associations between key variables 
measured at the country level, the first relationship considered is between the change in 
a country’s governance and growth in GDP per capita. Governance is measured using 
the Kaufmann governance indicator (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005) which is a 
composite indicator based on six indicators of governance.16 Figure 1 shows the plot 
between the change in the aggregate governance indicator (1998-2004) and the average 
annual growth in real GDP per capita (2000-04), the underlying assumption being that if 
there is a relationship, it should be observed between growth and a change in 
governance over a longer horizon. From the plot there is a discernible positive 
association between these variables, confirmed by a sample correlation coefficient of 
0.459 (p-value: 0.0014), which suggests the linear association is highly significant.  































Changes in governance, 1998-2004 
 
Note: Own calculations based on observations for 46 African countries. 
Source:  World Bank (2005); Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003/2005). 
 
                                                 
15 Plus several classic papers on institutions and growth referred to and providing the background to the 
report by the Commission for Africa (2005), which places a heavy emphasis on the improvement of 
governance as a key to growth and poverty reduction in Africa. 
16  The six components are (i) voice and accountability, (ii) political stability, (iii) government 
effectiveness, (iv) regulatory quality, (v) rule of law, and (vi) control of corruption. Each component 
in each country is assessed on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5. Our calculations are based on an unweighted 
average of these six component indicators. 15 
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Note: Own calculations based on observations for 46 African countries. 
Source:  World Bank (2005); Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003/2005). 
 
In Figure 2 a second association is explored between governance (as defined above) and 
the change in the trade intensity. Again, to smooth out as much volatility in the annual 
openness ratios as possible, the change in trade intensity is measures as the proportional 
change in the averages of the trade openness ratios in the periods 1995-99 and 2000-04. 
Again, the plot is indicative of some positive association (an improvement in 
governance being associated with more openness), confirmed by a correlation 
coefficient of 0.277 although this is not statistically significant (p-value: 0.069). 
The Kaufmann governance indicators are based on a wide range of responses about the 
quality of governance at the country level, derived from expert groups, institutes, NGOs 
and international organizations. They are predominantly subjective but are widely 
regarded as reputable indicators. The plots in both Figures 1 and 2 are only intended to 
be indicative of relationships and, at best, do just that. Formal (often panel data-based 
econometric) analyses of governance and economic performance in Africa are already 
underway (e.g., Amin, Bussari and Ntilivamunda 2005). There is also a view that 
governance may be endogenous. Hence it might be important to heed caution in putting 
too much reliance on bivariate associations and to recognize there may be a multiplicity 
of causal factors in the governance, growth, globalization nexus. Sachs (2003) is 
prominent in cautioning not to place all the weight on a single-factor explanation of 
growth and development and, while Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and 
others show that institutions and governance are important contributory factors, but so 
are geography, health and human capital, etc. (Sachs 2003). The focus in the present 
paper is on the growth, globalization (and poverty) nexus, hence it is sufficient to 
indicate that governance may be a related factor, alongside resource endowments and 
geography, and more credence ought not to be inferred from it than this. 
 16 
3.3  Evidence on globalization at the country level in Africa 
For completeness, Table 7 shows some results from calculations of the EGI for 
countries in Africa (Lockwood and Redoano 2005). The table includes only those 
countries for which sufficient data were available to compute the index between 1983 
and 2004. Some countries enter the series during this period. This is a problem and is  
due entirely to the lack of data. There are also significant country omissions, such as 
Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, Madagascar, Burundi and Ethiopia, some of which figure 
 
Table 7 
Economic globalization index for countries in Africa (SSA) 
  1983 1987 1990 1993 1997 2000 2004 
         
Angola         0.219 
Benin     0.079  0.100 0.101 0.097 0.084 
Burkina Faso  0.094  0.098  0.094 0.102 0.099 0.099 0.089 
Botswana  0.183 0.201 0.159 0.136 0.163 0.154 0.135 
Côte d'Ivoire  0.134  0.128 0.128 0.124 0.146 0.145 0.154 
Cameroon   0.081  0.085  0.083 0.102 0.115 0.114 
Congo,  Rep.       0.202  0.194  0.195 
Comoros  0.047 0.039 0.029 0.038 0.048 0.030 0.033 
Cape  Verde        0.085  0.097 
Gabon       0.129  0.136  0.134 
Guinea        0.093  0.102 
Guinea-Bissau         0.096 
Kenya  0.116 0.115 0.129 0.168 0.137 0.136 0.127 
Liberia  0.146 0.126 0.128 0.132 0.137 0.107 0.091 
Mali         0.131 
Mozambique         0.151 
Mauritania      0.138 0.113 0.110 0.119 
Mauritius     0.168  0.131 0.128 0.132 0.127 
Malawi  0.105 0.109 0.109 0.100 0.137 0.150 0.128 
Namibia         0.144 
Niger  0.089 0.098 0.097 0.099 0.088 0.093 0.180 
Nigeria   0.157  0.181  0.210 0.193 0.202 0.101 
Rwanda  0.060 0.058 0.050 0.058 0.067 0.064 0.069 
Sudan         0.097 
Senegal  0.135 0.095 0.100 0.093 0.111 0.120 0.124 
Sierra Leone  0.054  0.082  0.104 0.084 0.055 0.084 0.090 
Sao Tome and Principe  0.017 0.002 0.000 0.025 0.057 0.082 0.125 
Swaziland  0.195 0.213 0.210 0.219 0.204 0.201 0.223 
Seychelles     0.090  0.078 0.100 0.129 0.129 
Togo  0.137 0.129 0.131 0.102 0.121 0.127 0.131 
South Africa          0.119 0.126 0.135 
Zambia       0.135  0.136  0.121 
Zimbabwe  0.091 0.104 0.106 0.127 0.151 0.123 0.072 
Note:   Some countries are excluded owing to the lack of data necessary to compile the index to date. 
These include Burundi, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, The Gambia, 
Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mayotte, Somalia, Chad, Tanzania, Uganda, Congo 
Democratic Republic. 
Source:  Lockwood and Redoano (2005). 17 
prominently in empirical and analytical work on globalization and poverty in Africa.17 
Viewing and comparing the outcomes for 2004, the results suggest that Swaziland is the 
most globalized African country, closely followed by Angola, and that Comoros is the 
least globalized. According to Lockwood and Redoano’s calculations, a half of the 25 
countries for which estimates exist are less globalized in 2004 than they were in 2000. 
Overall, the mixed picture across countries is a significant feature of the table. Some 
countries appear to show signs of steady globalization (South Africa, Cameroon), some 
show a downward trend (Liberia), some show U-shaped tendencies (Côte d’Ivoire) and 
others are inverse U-shaped (Zimbabwe, Nigeria). So the average trends for Africa 
reported earlier (Table 5) subsumes considerable variation across countries. Clearly, 
these results are questionable, and may say as much about the inadequacies of the data 
and methodology than about the level or trends in globalization. On the other hand, the 
fact that there is so much variation, with few countries showing striking changes, may 
confirm the view that Africa is not showing significant signs of globalization. 
3.4  Evidence on change in poverty levels at the country level in Africa 
Evidence on the level and change in (income) poverty in Africa (SSA), either at the all-
Africa level or country level across Africa, is relatively scarce (Ali and Thorbecke 
2000). There has been a sequence of important studies by Ravallion, Chen and 
associates (most recently, for example, Chen and Ravallion 2004) in attempting to make 
international poverty comparisons at the global and regional levels. This project has 
helped significantly in assembling a database of household surveys, although there are 
well-known issues of data quality and comparability, both between surveys for 
individual countries (i.e., over time) and across countries, that make comparisons 
difficult. In their study making international poverty comparisons Chen et al. rely on a 
small number of countries, and benchmark their poverty comparisons to international 
poverty lines, including the $1 per day ($30.42 per month) line. 
Ali and Thorbecke (2000) assess the level and change in poverty in Africa based on 
secondary information for 16 SSA countries (representing about 47 per cent of the total 
population of SSA). As in the present paper, their objective is mainly descriptive and 
uses countries as the units of observation. However, instead of using absolute poverty 
lines (e.g., international poverty lines) they estimate relative poverty lines, but build in a 
non-proportional variation of the poverty lines with income, thereby avoiding the usual 
assumption that ‘poverty changes over time are not affected by the growth in mean 
income’ (Ali and Thorbecke 2000: 13). Their study focuses on an analysis of rural 
versus urban poverty, the relationship between the change in poverty and the change in 
mean income and the change in distribution (inequality). Their results show that change 
in inequality matters, especially as regards the results for urban poverty. Importantly, 
the research is based on secondary data generated by Povcal, a programme for 
calculating poverty measures from grouped data developed by Chen, Ravallion and 
associates (Chen and Ravallion 2004).  
In this section we also use Povcal, but advance one stage further into the realm of 
secondary data, by generating some observations on poverty (headcount ratios) and 
                                                 
17 The introduction of countries (or complete omission) into the EGI for SSA is also problematic for 
interpreting the regional index. Countries are weighted by GDP (PPP) to form the aggregate index, so 
the EGI index is affected as and when countries are included, and the weights are adjusted. 18 
inequality (Gini coefficients) for selected African countries from PovcalNet. PovcalNet 
generates these summary statistics based on grouped data drawn from a databank of 
household surveys for selected countries, and chosen poverty lines. The default poverty 
line is the PPP-based $1 a day international line, although this can be varied. In view of 
the availability of this database and software, PovcalNet was applied to all the datasets 
available for African countries, selecting those countries for which there are at least two 
household surveys. This gave rise to results for 19 countries, spanning the period 1985 
to 2000. Chen and Ravallion (2004) and earlier papers discuss in detail the problems of 
the comparability and consistency of household surveys, and there are many.18 So in 
those cases where more than two household surveys are available, two surveys were 
selected to achieve what seemed to be the best degree of comparability. The surveys 
chosen were not always the earliest and latest surveys available for each country, and 
the intervals between surveys are quite variable, ranging from 2 years (Zambia) to 10 
years (Uganda), with an average gap of 5.6 years. PovcalNet generates estimates of the 
headcount, poverty-gap (PG) and squared PG ratios, and the Gini coefficient. However, 
for our purposes, we confine our attention to the headcount ratio and Gini coefficient, 
and simply observe the directions of change that are indicated by these respective 
estimates in each country and disregard the magnitude of change.19 Table 8 sets out the 
results. 
Overall, the results in Table 8 show a preponderance of countries where it appears 
poverty (headcount ratio) has been falling between survey years. In twelve countries the 
headcount ratio fell, in six countries it rose and in one country (South Africa) it was 
virtually unchanged. This pattern is broadly consistent with the overall estimates 
produced by Chen and Ravallion (2004) and reproduced earlier in Table 1. As regards 
inequality (Gini coefficient) PovcalNet generated results showing six countries where 
inequality fell, eleven in which it increased, and two countries (Kenya20 and Uganda) in 
which it was virtually unchanged. It suggests a tendency for inequality to have increased 
overall. Of potentially greater interest is the outcome in terms of both poverty and 
inequality in each country. In those countries where poverty increased, the predominant 
outcome was that inequality also increased, whereas in those countries where poverty 
decreased, there was no clear direction of change in inequality. Obviously, it is difficult 
to draw firm conclusions without introducing information on growth rates and other 
controlling variables at the country level, so as ascertain whether it is the growth in 
incomes (or the lack of it) and/or changes in inequality that best describe the outcome 
on the change in poverty. Nevertheless, the pattern of results at the country level does 
 
                                                 
18 Detailed notes accompanying PovcalNet indicate that surveys for individual countries may not be 
comparable: Priority Surveys alongside LSMS surveys, Integrated Household Surveys, income and 
expenditure surveys, welfare monitoring surveys, etc. 
19  For those countries in which there are more than two surveys, the direction of change is not always 
uniform, and this is a further complication of this cursory analysis. It might, of course, be possible to 
use other information (maybe country poverty assessments) to ascertain whether poverty has been 
generally falling, rising or changing direction during the past 15 to 20 years. 
20 The results for Kenya are perhaps surprising and questionable on the grounds that this change was 
based on a short time interval (1994-97) and that it excludes results from the 1998/9 Integrated 
Household Survey, which indicated a marked increase in inequality. 19 
Table 8 
Poverty and inequality change at the country level in Africa: 
Some evidence based on PovcalNet 
Country Survey  years  Headcount  (%)  Change (+/−)  Gini coefficients  Change (+/−) 
         
Botswana  1985-93  33.3 – 32.1  − 54.2  − 66.7  + 
Burkina Faso  1994-98  51.4 – 44.9  − 50.7  − 46.9  − 
Burundi 1992-98  45.2 − 54.6  +  33.3 v 42.3  + 
Cameroon 1996-2001  32.5 − 17.1  − 46.8  − 44.6  − 
Cote d’Ivoire  1993-98  9.9 − 15.5  +  36.9 − 43.8  + 
Ethiopia 1995-2000  31.3 − 23.0  − 40.0  − 30.0  − 
The Gambia  1992-98  53.7 – 27.1  − 47.8  − 50.2  + 
Ghana  1988-98  45.5 – 40.5  − 36.0  − 40.8  + 
Kenya  1994-97  26.5 – 20.1  −  44.5 – 42.5  − 
Lesotho 1986-95  30.3 − 36.4  +  56.0 − 63.1  + 
Madagascar  1993-99  46.3 – 66.0  +  46.1 − 39.1  − 
Malawi  1997-2004  41.7 – 21.3  −  50.3 – 39.0  − 
Mali  1994-2001  72.3 – 36.4  −  50.5 – 40.0  − 
Mauritania 1995-2000  28.6 − 25.9  −  37.3 – 39.0  + 
Niger  1992-94  41.7 – 54.8  +  36.1 – 41.5  + 
Nigeria  1992-96  59.2 – 77.9  +  45.0 – 52.0  + 
Rwanda  1984-99  35.7 – 51.8  +  28.9 – 45.4  + 
Senegal  1994-2001  24.0 – 17.0  − 41.4  − 41.3  = 
South Africa  1993-2000  10.0 − 10.7  =  59.3 − 57.8  − 
Uganda  1989-99  39.2 – 26.4  − 44.4  − 43.1  − 
Zambia 1996-98  72.6 − 65.7  − 49.8  − 52.4  + 
Zimbabwe 1990-95  54.4 − 56.1  +  56.2 − 50.1  − 
Notes:  PovcalNet is software (due to Chen and Ravallion) which computes Headcount (and Poverty 
Gap and Squared P-G) indices based on a chosen poverty line and household survey data, 
usually in grouped data format. In this table the poverty line is the $1 a day international poverty 
line, converted into local currency (within PovcalNet) using PPP estimates. 
Source: PovcalNet  http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp and Chen and Ravallion 
(2004). 
not appear to be clear-cut. Also, as noted earlier, we need to be cautious about the 
comparability of surveys and of placing too much reliance on just two data points for 
each country. 
The above evidence on the level and change in poverty and inequality on the one hand 
and the relative indices of economic globalization on the other permit us to carry out 
some tentative associations between variables. Tables 7 and 8 show there are twelve 
countries21 for which estimates exist on the levels and change in poverty and inequality, 
between various years, and globalization indices for 2004. As the poverty and inequality 
estimates for countries span varying time periods, to standardize the changes the 
estimates shown in Table 7 are divided by the span of years. Figures 3, 4 and 5 show 
simple plots of the 2004 economic globalization index versus the level of poverty, and 
versus the change in poverty, and versus the change in inequality.  
                                                 
21 The countries included are Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 20 
 






































































































Source:  For Figures 3, 4, and 5, the plots are based on Tables 7 and 8. 21 
The simple linear correlation coefficients between the globalization index and (i) the 
level of poverty is -0.30; (ii) the change in poverty is 0.32; and (iii) the change in 
inequality is 0.71. Only in (iii) is the coefficient significantly different from zero. These 
results suggest that globalization may be associated with an increase in inequality, with 
an increase in poverty, though with a lower level of poverty. Thus, countries which are 
more ‘globalized’ tend to have a lower level of poverty although poverty is increasing in 
these countries and so is inequality. This suggests that globalization may be associated 
with increasing inequality and (hence) with an increase in poverty. However, the 
evidence is not strong and is at best indicative. 
3.5  Other country-level dimensions of change in poverty in Africa 
This paper has focussed exclusively on income poverty. Other socioeconomic 
dimensions of wellbeing have not been considered and it is a moot point whether, and to 
what extent, health, education, environmental sustainability, gender imbalance, etc., 
have been affected by (and in turn may influence) globalization and growth. But this 
would broaden the scope of the paper beyond feasible limits. Useful sources of evidence 
for Africa are summarized in Geda and Shimeless (2005), UNECA (2005) and 
Commission for Africa (2005).  
What perhaps is more useful as a prelude to analytical work is the evidence on structural 
profiles in African countries. Structural features are now considered to be central to 
understanding the channels through which globalization impacts on growth, poverty and 
inequality (Nissanke and Thorbecke 2005; Culpeper 2005) and also underpin the 
possible policy initiatives underlying ‘pro-poor growth’. Structural features are wide-
ranging, going beyond product or sectoral disaggregations, and include rural-urban 
dimensions, gender, labour markets (by skill, formal-informal employment), and the 
ownership of enterprises (private-public, foreign and domestic ownership). Many of 
these profiles are discussed, and some evidence presented, in the reports for the 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA 2005) and in a study by Fielding (2001).  
According to the standard (HOS) trade model, trade liberalization in Africa should lead 
(or have led) to an expansion of use of its most abundant factor resource, low-skilled 
labour. Because of the anti-agricultural bias of trade protection (UNECA 2005) this 
should be expected to boost, ceteris paribus, an expansion of small-scale agriculture, 
and a relative reduction of rural poverty. In their summary of the extent of poverty in 
Africa, Ali and Thorbecke (2000) note that at the beginning of the 1990s, rural poverty 
was very widespread and substantially higher than urban poverty.22 So what we have 
produced in Table 9 is the available evidence on rural and poverty headcount ratios at 
the country level in Africa, based on published household survey data post-1990 in the 
World Development Indicators 2005 (World Bank 2005). We assume that the survey 
results for urban and rural households are more likely to be comparable than between 
countries or over time. Out of 32 surveys reported in Table 9, in 30 cases there was a 
positive differential between rural and urban poverty, and in many cases this is recorded 
                                                 
22  Note that the urban and rural poverty lines were not the same, because their estimates were based on 
relative (and country-specific) poverty lines. But still the rural and urban poverty ratios (headcount, 
poverty gap and squared P-G) were substantially different. 22 
as a double-digit difference.23 So rural poverty in Africa remains persistent and is 
substantially higher than in urban areas (Wood 1998). In only ten countries is there 
reported evidence from more than one survey, and (as mentioned earlier) it is 
questionable whether the surveys for each country are directly comparable. 
Nevertheless, in half of the countries, the rural-urban differential in headcount ratios fell 
and in half they rose: at best, this is an inconclusive result. 
Table 9 
Rural-urban differentials of poverty ratios (headcount ratios) 
Country Survey  year 
Rural-urban poverty differential  
(% headcount ratio) 
    
Benin 1995  -  3.3 
 1999    9.7 
Burkina Faso  1994  40.6 
 1998  34.6 
Burundi 1990  -  7.0 
Cameroon 1996 18.2 
 2001  27.8 
Chad 1996    4.0 
Ethiopia 1996  13.7 
 2000    8.0 
The Gambia  1998  13.0 
Ghana 1999  31.9 
Kenya 1994  18.0 
 1997    4.0 
Madagascar 1997  12.8 
 1999  24.6 
Malawi 1998  11.6 
Mali 1998  45.8 
Namibia 1996  35.4 
 2000  35.8 
Mozambique 1997    9.3 
Nigeria 1993    6.0 
Niger 1993  14.0 
Rwanda 2000  51.4 
Senegal 1992  16.8 
Sierra Leone  2004  22.4 
Tanzania 1991    9.6 
 2001    9.2 
Zambia 1996  36.8 
 1998  27.1 
Zimbabwe 1992 32.4 
 1996  40.1 
Source:   Based on UNECA (2005: Figure 3.3);  
Own calculations from data derived from World Bank (2005). 
                                                 
23 These results are based on national (not international) poverty lines and we must assume that in most 
cases (if not all) there are no separate rural and urban poverty lines. This may exaggerate the rural-
urban differential, but they are still considered large. 23 
4  Analytical approaches and empirical evidence for Africa 
4.1  Deeper analytical approaches 
A more rigorous empirical investigation of the channels of influence and possible causal 
relationships within the globalization-growth-inequality-poverty nexus, set out and 
discussed by Nissanke and Thorbecke (2005), invite several alternative approaches of 
analysis.24 Each analytical approach has both advantages and disadvantages: there is no 
universally acceptable way in which one can assess the impacts of a globalization 
shock, or indeed of any impulse, conclusively. Theory alone is not sufficient and it is 
necessary to pursue an evidence-based (empirical) approach to assess the linkages and 
impacts further. At the risk of some oversimplification, existing studies may be 
dichotomized into econometric and simulation approaches. We first briefly set out some 
of the pros and cons of these approaches because this is relevant to a review of the 
studies we consider subsequently. 
4.2 Econometric  analysis 
Apart from their reliance on consistent data, whether cross-section, timeseries or even 
panel data, econometric models are usually estimated as reduced-form relationships, and 
therefore the approach is quite problematic in ascertaining channels of effect linking 
policy variables with outcomes (Devarajan and Robinson 2005). These links ideally 
need to be identified via structural relationships (Fielding 2001). The econometric 
approach has therefore most often been used in the context of estimating channel 
‘segments’, such as trade-growth, growth-inequality, trade-wages, export performance-
productivity relationships. Tied up with the difficulty of estimating structural 
relationships, there is the problem of choosing the relevant control variables so as to 
identify the channels of effect. For example, the magnitude of many responses (say, the 
income effects of price shocks) will depend crucially on sociopolitical factors as well as 
economic factors, of a country-specific or time-specific nature such as the institutional 
capability, local conflicts, geography, etc. (Bigsten and Fosu 2004). These are not easy 
to quantify and therefore not easy to account for in regressions. Nevertheless, the 
econometric approach has proved popular and useful in statistical (as opposed to 
structural) analyses of growth and inequality, determining regularities over time and 
across countries. 
4.3 Simulation  modelling 
Simulation models (such as computable general equilibrium, CGE, or linked 
microsimulation-CGE models) are an alternative empirical approach to ascertaining 
magnitude and directions of effect explicitly via channels of impact, and are more suited 
to counterfactual rather than predictive analysis (Devarajan and Robinson 2005). There 
are several examples of their application in an African context, some of which are 
reviewed in the next section. Amongst the main advantages of CGE models is their 
ability to trace the effects of an exogenous ‘shock’ (in this case, for example, a 
globalizing shock such as the removal of tariffs, or inflows of capital) through the 
                                                 
24 Hertel and Reimer (2005) have recently surveyed alternative models of the effects of trade policy on 
the poor. 24 
system as it impacts on markets and on real incomes of households. They are 
representative of the classic counterfactual experimentation, and the literature is vast. 
Many scholars would caution about the drawbacks and even dangers of CGE modelling. 
For example, econometricians are sceptical of the use of single datapoint ‘estimates’ or 
even ‘guesstimates’ of parameters. Macroeconomists are wary of the primitive or even 
ad hoc macroeconomic features that many models employ along with large-dimensional 
equilibrium representations of product and factor markets (Robinson and Lofgren 
2005). For sure, it has been shown many times over that the macro ‘closure’ rules drive 
the results to a very significant degree. Most of the applications of CGE models are 
large-scale comparative static models showing impacts on representative household 
groups. To analyse poverty effects with these models a further link has to be included, 
either within the model or bolted on to the model outcomes (Decaluwé et al. 1999). 
Recently, more technical advances have generated CGE models with dynamic features 
and incorporating ‘real’ (as opposed to ‘representative’) households (referred to as RHG 
models) and microsimulation methods. It is not yet possible to provide an assessment, 
let alone a blanket assurance, that these more complex models are better able to capture 
poverty impacts than their first generation RHG counterparts. 
4.4  Evidence for Africa 
The specific links identified by Nissanke and Thorbecke (2005) are: globalization and 
growth, globalization and inequality, growth and inequality (bi-directional), and growth-
inequality on poverty. Within these broad links there may be several channels of effect. 
At first sight, there appear to be few studies that have specifically tackled the 
globalization-poverty relationship in African context. But it is not difficult to uncover 
many studies that qualify on the grounds that either they deal with specific links (e.g., 
openness-growth) or they consider policy shocks (e.g., structural adjustment 
programmes and economic reform) that have related liberalizing features.  
Link 1: Globalization and growth 
There is a good deal of mainly cross-section econometric evidence on the linkage 
between trade openness and growth. The most highly regarded studies are those that 
include a SSA dummy (possibly including interaction effects with other explanatory 
variables) in a more globally-based dataset. This is more likely to increase the 
explanatory power with more degrees of freedom. Interestingly, after controlling for 
geography and income, Frankel and Romer (1999) find no additional distinguishing 
factors for SSA. Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (1998) provide a panel analysis of 
trade reforms and growth, based on data for 73 countries, worldwide. Again, they find 
strong evidence of trade reform-induced effect on growth. They point out that this is not 
necessarily a strong, or even a positive effect for every country. But importantly, they 
do not include separate regional effects, so one cannot generalize about Africa from 
their study. Harrison (1996) has also performed an earlier panel analysis of openness 
and growth, and she too finds a positive relationship. Alongside this positive evidence 
there is no counter-evidence as such; that is, to demonstrate that openness is ‘bad’ for 
growth. The closest the dissenting voices (e.g., Ocampo and Taylor 1998) get to it, are 
challenges to the assumptions made about the underlying microeconomic conditions and 
the potential regressive effects of globalization.  
The specific evidence for Africa obtained from the global growth regressions is 
discussed by Collier and Gunning (1999). They report on four well-known studies that 25 
include Africa dummies; the studies are by Barro and Lee (1994), Easterly and Levine 
(1997), Sachs and Warner (1997) and Collier and Gunning (1999). The periods covered 
are closely comparable, predominantly covering the 1960s to the 1980s. All studies 
include an openness variable along with many other similar explanatory variables, with 
different interaction terms, but all have an African (shift) dummy. In two of the studies 
(Barro-Lee and Easterly-Levine) the Africa dummy is significant while in the others 
(Sachs-Warner and Collier-Gunning) the inclusion of an openness variable renders the 
dummy insignificant. While these studies are searching for broader explanations for 
relatively poor growth performance in Africa, they do provide us with evidence that 
openness does have a growth-enhancing effect in the region. It is the strength of this 
effect that is more questionable. 
While the cross-country growth regressions dominate, other studies provide significant 
and specific insights into the globalization-growth relationship, either at an individual 
country or sectoral level. A relatively early econometric study by van Frausum and Sahn 
(1993) examines the possible macroeconomic effects of four exogenous shocks, 
including currency devaluation, in Malawi.  There are many examples of similar models 
for other African economies. What they have in common is an attempt to track the 
consequences on other variables besides output. And this highlights channels of effect 
on households other than growth. There are also early examples of fairly aggregative 
country-specific simulation (CGE) models, which make no attempt at tracing through to 
individual household groups, but nevertheless examine the short-run consequences of 
trade liberalization. Classic examples are by Rattsø and Torvik (1998) in both an SSA 
and Zimbabwe context (they examine import rationing and trade liberalization but 
recognize the sensitivity of the results to alternative macro closure rules) and Davies, 
Rattsø and Torvik (1998) who consider the macroeconomic effects of trade 
liberalization in Zimbabwe. Bigsten and Fosu (2004) use an econometric approach 
using data for Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe to demonstrate that under trade 
liberalization, increases in exports of manufacturing firms lead to efficiency gains. 
Link 2: Globalization and Inequality 
The second primary macro-meso channel links globalization with inequality. There are 
many possible channels of effect, and the extent to which globalization impacts on 
factor markets, goods markets, government income and expenditure, etc., is largely an 
empirical question. Kanbur (1999) sets out the attendant problems of four facets of 
globalization on income distribution (principally the factoral distribution) in an African 
context. He provides no empirical evidence as such, but he urges caution against using 
theory to assume that the opportunities of globalization are a ‘win-win’ situation. 
Kanbur argues that inequality may well worsen, and is more concerned that this will 
induce policymakers into a retreat from globalization rather than managing the risk that 
inequality may worsen. 
In their econometric study of the long-term changes in the ratio of manufacturing wages 
and agricultural wages (a proxy for skilled-unskilled wage inequality) in Kenya, Bigsten 
and Durevall (2006) find that greater openness was linked directly to a reduction in 
wage inequality. On the other hand there is evidence in several African economies that 
there has been an increased urban-rural inequality, and that this is a source of the overall 
increase in inequality. Nicita and Razzaz (2003) look at the impact of an increase in 
textile exports on labour income in Madagascar and find significant differences by 
gender. Textiles are a highly labour-intensive good, and tracing the effects through 26 
labour markets is an excellent way to see how the benefits impact on households: who 
benefits and how?  
Fagernäs (2004) constructs a CGE model for Zimbabwe (based on the well-known, 
standard IFPRI model) to simulate the effects of adjustment and stabilization policies 
(devaluation and expenditure reduction). She considers the distributional implications 
for household groups (defined according to socioeconomic group) and finds that while 
agricultural households gain, many other household lose under combinations of policies. 
It is of interest to note that she tries to compare her results with those of Davies, Rattsø 
and Torvik (1998). Although the scenarios are different, her enquiry leads her to 
question the plausibility of her own results and to question the plausibility/validity of 
the macroeconomic closure rules of both models. This is a virtue of good-practice 
simulation work. Finally, Devarajan and van Mensbrugghe (2000) have also conducted 
a standard (RHG) CGE model analysis of the impact of trade reform on the income 
inequality between household defined according to their ethnic background and by 
income level. They show that trade reform could benefit black South Africans at the 
expense of white South Africans, although inequality would worsen within the black 
population and improve within the white population. 
Link 3: Growth and inequality 
Evidence on the (bi-directional) growth-inequality relationship in an African context is 
sparse. The global evidence on the correlates of income inequality, including economic 
growth and the level of development, has not been replicated, mainly due to the paucity 
of data. But some evidence is now emerging. Two studies in particular arise. First, 
Odedokun and Round (2004) study the bi-directional relationship between income 
inequality and growth in Africa using essentially cross-section evidence. The results 
suggest two things; first that based on African data, the postulated causality from 
economic growth to inequality does not seem to apply. Structural and geographical 
features were stronger explanations of inequality than growth per se. Second, the results 
suggest that inequality did appear to hinder growth in the countries sampled and, 
moreover that inequality is associated with channels that adversely affect growth such 
as socio-political instability, high fertility, and low school enrolment rates. In related 
work Fielding and Torres (2006) attempt to investigate further the reasons for the 
negative African dummy in growth regressions. They conclude that the reasons can be 
partly attributed to ‘ethno-linguistic fractionalization’, geography and socio-political 
factors, underlining the earlier suggestion that channels of effect from inequality to 
growth may be multifarious and complex. 
Link 4: Growth and inequality on poverty 
The question of the links from growth and inequality to determining the impacts on 
households groups and individuals has been addressed mainly (though not exclusively) 
via simulation models. Sahn, Dorosh and Younger (1996) carry out a study of ten 
African countries to examine the effects of adjustment policies and agricultural reforms 
on the poor, but they use an eclectic mix of analytical tools to do so, ranging from 
econometric models, through partial equilibrium models and CGE models. Apart from 
the significance of their main conclusions—that the adjustment programmes were 
marginally beneficial to the poor, in that they precipitated a redistribution of benefits 
though without positive growth effects—the study was instrumental in provoking a 
useful debate about the appropriateness of the methodology used. There are many other 
good examples of the use of CGE models in this context for African countries, 27 
including Chitiga (2000), Chitiga, Kandeiro and Mabugu (2005), for Zimbabwe, and, 
most recently, Emini, Cockburn and Decaluwé (2006) for Cameroon and Abdelkhalek 
(2006) for Morocco. Some of the most recent examples are highly innovative in having 
fully linked microsimulation and recursive dynamic features, thereby potentially 
embracing a fuller range of macro- and meso-level effects on households. The results 
from these models are not at all clear-cut and easy to summarize. There is a good deal of 
country-specificity; some evidence of inequalizing effects of trade policy shocks, and of 
poverty consequences that do not show dramatic improvement. There are some other 
studies that do not fit comfortably within this framework of analysis, but nevertheless 
provide valuable insights into what the data tell us. For example, Bigsten and Durevall 
(2003) use panel data from household surveys in Ethiopia, between 1994 to 1997 (the 
post-economic reform era), to examine the extent to which changes in poverty can be 
attributed to growth and distribution effects. The study is insightful. The authors 
conclude that increasing inequality offsets the potential poverty reduction from growth.  
Case study approach 
The studies reviewed above suggest that whatever methodological approach is pursued, 
a country case study may offer the best prospect of identifying the links, the channels of 
effect and their importance within the globalization-poverty nexus. There is clearly 
considerable country specificity, and whether this generalizes across countries, or across 
groupings of countries according to typology, is a more open question.  
A good example is South Africa, which is notable for its high degree of income 
inequality that has persisted in the post-apartheid era and throughout the recent era of 
globalization and liberalization. The indications are that there has been a decline in the 
dispersion of racial incomes and an increase in within-group income inequality. Several 
studies (Jenkins and Thomas 2004) indicate that there are several reasons for this, 
including, for example, (i) labour market imperfections and segmentation (wage 
differentials and unequal access to unemployment); and (ii) marked inequalities in asset 
distribution, education, social spending and land. Naudé and Coetzee (2004) and others 
suggest that globalization may have induced higher inequality through technological 
change, higher unemployment and less wage income towards poorer/unskilled 
households.  
5 Conclusions 
The results in this paper confirm that globalization has generally been a gradual and, 
indeed, a slow process in Africa relative to other global regions, whether globalization 
is perceived fairly narrowly as a process of greater trade openness or as a combination 
of several kinds of globalizing processes. The mechanisms through which globalization 
in its various manifestations impact on growth, inequality and poverty is still a matter of 
intense debate. Some authors claim that globalization is good for poverty reduction by 
promoting growth, although the outcome may be affected (even mitigated or offset) by 
the effects on inequality. The net effects for Africa suggest that poverty incidence has 
remained persistently high alongside a relatively slow globalizing process and generally 
sluggish growth performance. 
What this paper has shown is that there is considerable variation within these broad 
regional outcomes. For a start, income inequality within Africa (notwithstanding the 28 
difficulty as to how best measure this) seems high relative to other regions and is 
persistently so. A priori expectations of the impact of globalization on distribution are 
not clear-cut (Kanbur 1999; Nissanke and Thorbecke 2005) and this is borne out by the 
evidence. Indeed, there are good reasons to expect that trade liberalization will not 
necessarily be inequality-reducing, as would be the naïve expectation under the standard 
Heckscher-Ohlin model. Segmented factor markets (including rural and urban 
dichotomies), entrenched social and culturally-based gender and ethnic dimensions 
mean there is considerable country specificity, and no easy ‘all-Africa’ prediction. But 
as regards globalization and growth outcomes since the early 1980s, the typology 
analysis has revealed marked variation across subgroups. In particular, and predictably, 
oil-producing and resource-intensive countries have grown faster, and are significantly 
more open to trade, and attract a higher proportion of FDI relative to GDP, than 
resource-poor countries. Geography also seems to matter in that amongst the resource-
poor countries, there appears to be some difference in the average performance of 
landlocked and coastal countries, although the differences are less clear-cut and maybe 
less significant. 
The evidence on changes in poverty and inequality across African countries is more 
fragmentary, and therefore difficult to assess. There are several issues and difficulties 
here. First, there are relatively few African countries that are able to report household 
survey evidence on changes in income (or expenditure) on a comparable basis during 
the past 25 years. The partial evidence that does exist has been assessed for the Africa 
region as a whole by Chen and Ravallion (2004) and this underpins the outcome that 
suggests poverty incidence remains high. But it is quite difficult to investigate changes 
in poverty incidence at a country level, for example in line with typologies. Second, 
many authors (for example, Ali and Thorbecke 2000) argue strongly for the use of 
country-specific (and locally-based) poverty lines for country-level poverty monitoring 
and analysis. However, cross-country analysis can only be satisfactorily undertaken 
with international poverty lines. In this case, and based on Chen and Ravallion’s 
PovcalNet software, we observe the broadly comparable changes in poverty incidence 
and income inequality across 19 countries, and note that slightly more of the countries 
show a decline in poverty incidence while roughly the same number of countries show 
an increase in inequality as show a decrease. There is still insufficient evidence to 
pursue cross-country empirical analysis suggested by Sahn and Younger (2004) or 
undertaken for selected countries by Christiaensen, Demery and Paternostro (2003). In 
any case, there is so much country-specificity and so many problems with cross-country 
analysis, that it is likely that the only way to trace the various channels and mechanisms 
of globalization is through country studies. 
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Appendix Table  
Subgroups of Sub-Saharan African countries used in Table 6 
Oil-producing countries  Resource-intensive  Coastal, resource-poor  Landlocked, resource-poor 
Fast-growers  
(g > 0: 1990-94) 
Slow-growers 
(g < 0: 1990-94) 
      
Angola  Angola  Benin  Burkina Faso  Equatorial Guinea  Angola 
Cameroon Botswana  Cape  Verde  Burundi  Nigeria  Cameroon 
Congo, Rep. of  Cameroon  Comoros  Central African Republic  Botswana  Congo, Rep. of 
Equatorial Guinea  Congo, Rep. of  Côte d’Ivoire  Chad  Namibia  Sierra Leone 
Sao Tome & Principe  Equatorial Guinea  Gambia, The  Congo, Dem. Rep.  Benin  Zambia 
Côte d’Ivoire  Gabon  Ghana  Ethiopia  Cape Verde  Côte d’Ivoire 
Chad Guinea  Guinea-Bissau  Lesotho  Ghana  Madagascar 
Gabon Namibia  Kenya Malawi Guinea-Bissau  Togo 
Nigeria  Sao Tome & Principe  Madagascar  Mali  Mauritius  Burundi 
  Sierra Leone  Mauritius  Niger  Mozambique  Central African Republic 
  Zambia  Mozambique  Rwanda  Seychelles  Congo, Dem. Rep. 
  Senegal  Swaziland  Burkina  Faso  Niger 
  Seychelles  Uganda  Lesotho  Rwanda 
  South  Africa  Zimbabwe  Swaziland  Guinea 
    Tanzania    Uganda  Sao Tome & Principe 
  Togo   Mali  Comoros 
    Chad  Zimbabwe 
    Gambia,  The  Kenya 
    Gabon  Senegal 
     South  Africa 
     Tanzania 
     Ethiopia 
     M a l a w i  
Source: IMF (2005: Tables A2, A3).  
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